



Scotland is a perplexing place at present. It is on the threshold of a major 
constitutional reform which will greatly enhance its political life and which 
will change the course of its history in unpredictable ways. The debate 
about the nature of this reform must rate as one of the most important since 
the Union. A basic assumption of the debate seems to be that devolutionary 
settlement is inevitable - and certainly no political party is committed to 
anything else. Given this, it is difficult to generate excitement about what is 
being publicly contested - namely, institutional arrangements and 
relationships. And until the institutions are formed there is no real forum 
for the discussion of political issues in a Scottish context. 
This is a shame. There are important questions to be asked and answered 
about the contents of the devolutionary package, and, in order to stimulate 
a sensible discussion, there is a place for a strong anti-devolutionary voice: 
there is also a need to look at the relationship of any new arrangements to 
existing institutions of government, without assuming that they will all be 
swept away. Parallel to both these discussions there should be some 
semblance of political debate about the needs of Scotland and the 
implications of today's economic and social problems. 
Edinburgh University's Unit for the Study of Government in Scotland 
was created in the hope that it might act as a catalyst by bringing together 
people from inside and outside the world of government to discuss these 
issues. The publication of this Yearbook is an example of the enterprise. 
The intention is not that it should provide the answers to the pressing 
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questions of the day but rather that it should serve as a focus for debate. 
Hence there are papers reviewing two major areas of governmental 
activity which have a distinctive Scottish mark and which have already 
undergone major reform; there are a series of papers on aspects of the 
current devolution debate, and there are discussions of some of the 
pressing political issues of the moment. 
We have set outselves two tasks in this Introduction. We will underline 
some of the more important points made by our contributors, locate their 
papers in the current debate and relate them to one another. At the same 
time, we see it as our job in this Yearbook to emphasise some aspects and 
consequences of what is happening which are commonly overlooked. In 
this role we have tried to ensure some balance in the debate. This second 
task has forced us much against our own inclinations into a rather 
pessimistic view. For the fact is that political debate often proceeds by 
raising expectations. The debate about devolution is no exception, with all 
parties tempted to raise the expectations of their supporters. It is 
manifestly the responsibility of such a book as .this to call attention to the 
more problematic consequences of what is proposed. We do this in no spirit 
of gloom, simply in the belief that dangers are less likely to be encountered 
if understood in advance. 
It is intended that the Yearbook become an annual publication and, to 
this end, there is a bibliographical and reference section which will be 
brought up to date with each issue. There are a number of other subjects we 
had hoped to look at in this volume- recent developments in the working of 
the Scottish Office, the way in which Shetland has handled oil development, 
the early experience and prospects of the Scottish Development Agency, 
and the effects of the cuts in public\expenditure on the personal social 
services, to name but four. Plans are in hand for the 1977 volume. which 
will pursue these and other matters. By the time of its publication the first 
District Council elections and perhaps a General Election will have taken 
place. There will also be considered comment on these. 
II 
Few people, it seems, appreciate in anything more than a general way 
the problems which government at national level face and the difficulties 
which politicians and administrators have in resolving them. It is hoped 
that the essays which follow will help in sowing some of the seeds of 
understanding. There can be few things more misunderstood than the 
re-organisation of local government or apparently faceless than the 
Scottish Office. Robert Peggie's paper encompasses the former but it has 
proved difficult to get an informed account of the latter's operation. This 
raises a problem which must be overcome. There is too great a reluctance-
stemming from the legal inhibitions of the OfficialSecretsActs and the 
informal conventions which surround them - for insiders in central 
government to write about what they see around them. Of course, no 
practising politician or official can be expected to write in a detailed way 
about either his day-to-day existence or his colleagues, but there is a happy 
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medium between this and a description of the organisation chart. 
This same reluctance to describe how the machnine of central 
government works seems also to inhibit conversation with informed 
outsiders so that second hand pictures can be painted. Yet interested 
citizens will begin to understand how daily business is conducted and the 
kinds of problems which confront their governors only when the shrouds 
are lifted. 
A rational reformer of Scottish government, able to ignore the external 
world and the passage of time, would not have considered a reform of local 
government or the health service or, possibly, thecreationof a Scottish 
Development Agency - let alone membership of the European Economic 
Community- as separable from the design of the devolution package. Had 
the Conservative government of 1970 been able to forsee, in 1971 or 1972, 
that nationalism had not 'gone away', a devolutionary settlement 
primarily with an administrative base and linked with local government 
reform might have produced a system of government entirely different 
from the one we are now envisaging - and incidentally had a considerable 
impact on the course of party politics. But then politics is not an entirely 
rational business and the steady march of events cannot be ignored. 
Rightly or wrongly, particular problems usually have to be viewed in their 
own temporal context, and such are the pressures, sorted out on their own 
merits. 
One such problem was the reform of the Health Service, which is 
discussed in Drummond Hunter's paper. The reform was conceived and 
executed as the result of changes within the Health Service itself. The new 
system, Hunter suggests, is flexible enough, and tied closely enough to the 
control of those who have to operate it, to be able to adjust to new situations 
as they arise. In the immediate future, instead of thinking of hospitals and 
doctors as machines and technicians producing healthy people who can 
return to the community- rather like so many serviced cars returning to 
the road from a few expensive garages - we shall have to start thinking 
about the creation of a 'healthy community'. What we need is not so much a 
health service as a health policy. Scots have fewer teeth per head than the 
citizens of any other industria lis nation. Bad dentistry? No- bad diets. What 
does devolution have to do with all this? Very little; but Hunter, like 
others. is uneasy about the prospect of 'political' interference in a situation 
which is complicated enough as it is. 
The work of contemporary democratic government is both complex and 
difficult. Most of the essays in this volume refer implicity to this problem. 
The prospect of a devolution of executive and legislative power to an 
elected assembly raises some of these complexities though it is far from 
certain that it will resolve them. We have to keep several conflicting 
necessities in mind. Our government should be accountable to those whom 
it governs. This is the strongest constitutional (as opposed to 'Scottish') 
argument for devolution: we need a public check on the activities of the 
Scottish Office. But while being accountable, our government must also 
have reasonably clear and tolerably consistent political direction. Such 
direction must not change too frequently. Accountability without clear, 
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consistent and constant policy can simply be a recipe for ad hoc populism.
It is also very inefficient. The consequences of policy changes often take
years to be felt. If we change policies too frequently no one benefits and our
social problems simply fester while representative government loses
credibility with the electorate. In addition, we need to attract competent
trained professional advisers into public affairs and once we have them, to
ensure that their expertise is used. Our social problems will not yield to
amateurs. We live in a technologically sophisticated society and we need
the advice of those trained to handle our com plica ted machinery if wlre to
master it. We also need skilled administrators to hold the loose ends of
policy together and, finally, we need an informed public opinion. 
The administrative reforms which have taken place in advance of
devolution have been intended to achieve some or all of these objectives. As
the paper on local government shows, reorganisation was based on the
considerations of the Wheatley Report though a number of changes were
made both inside and outside Parliament to meet particular interests. It is
unfortunate that structural reorganisation did not go hand-in-hand with a
revision of the financial base and that the pressures of inflation have made
the new authorities unpopular before they have had a chance to prove
themselves. The Layfield Committee's report has opened up the debate
about the financing of local authorities, and thus, once again, the debate
about the relationship between central and local government. The
prospects are heartening for local government in England and Wales. For
Scotland the question is complicated by the prospective relationships of
local authorities to the Assembly. 
Many observers and most ratepayers underestimated the time it would
take for the trauma of reorganisation to be left behind and for the system to
settle down (an important pointer to the difficulties the Assembly and its
administration will have?). The issue is now whether the system will ever
settle. If the Assembly and its Executive decide that they want to be seen to
be responsible for the good government of Scotland, as well as for the
passage of devolved legislation, then there will inevitably be conflict
between them and the local authorities and pressure for another reform.
The knowledge of this is disturbing to councillors and officials who are
already reeling under public attack for many things outside their control
and who are, at the same time, having to cope with severe curtailment of
expenditure in areas of provision in which the public has become
accustomed to growth. 
Local government must go on to the offensive if it is to secure
satisfactory working relationships with the Assembly. There is every
reason for it to do so. An Assembly sitting in Edinburgh is no substitute for
local government and the arguments which have traditionally supported
the idea of democratically elected local institutions with their own
administrative sys1em are as pertinent now as they ever were. What is
important is that a modus operandi be established. 
As Peggie argues, it is probably too early to assess adequately the
successes and failures of reorganisation. There are certainly widespread
reservations about the two tier system and, with the Assembly, Scots will
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have substantial grounds for complaining of over-government. There is 
near universal agreement that it was mistaken to detach housing from 
regional provision of education and social work. And history may judge the 
reorganisation badly because while the interdependence of local 
authority activities has been accepted in principle, the traditional 
committee structure has been left pretty well intact. Further, nothing has 
been done to create a general administrative cadre who could in time 
spread across all departments and, like their counterparts in the civil 
service, develop networks within which business could be done. 
III 
It is worth noting that whereas the importance of the politician's role 
the need for clear political direction has been recognised in local 
government, the reformed Scottish Health Service has appeared to turn a 
blind eye to these issues. The health service is not directly responsible to 
any elected body and the influence of its professionals and managers has 
been increased. The Health Boards are composed of individuals nominated 
or appointed with no recognisable constituency and consequently 
uncertain in their role. The medical profession has argued before and since 
its nationalisation that it should be distanced from politicians. The two 
organisational charts of the health service in Scotland discussed by Hunter 
give the game away. The older structure is shown in a chart which clearly 
indicates that final authority goes through the Secretary of State to 
Parliament. The chart of the recently reorganised service stops with the 
Secretary of State. No mention of Parliament is made. A neater illustration 
of the administrators' and the professionals' recurrent day dream is hard 
to imagine. But there is a serious question here. Surely the allocation of 
medical resources involves political choice as much as the allocation of, 
say, educational resources? If this is so, then as financial resources 
become scarcer so the importance of public involvement in the debate 
about priorities will increase. As Drummond Hunter points out, modern 
medicine is so expensive that its control is inevitably a political issue. 
Fear of political, interference is also a factor in the argument about 
whether the universities should be devolved. Yet Professor John Mcintyre 
is surely right to argue that the future proximity of government to the 
universities need not work to their detriment. In 1976-77 the University 
Grants Committee is giving one-eighth of its building allocation to the 
London School of Economics, so that the School, which is not a mile from 
Westminster, can convert a warehouse into a new library. Baleful 
influence? For many reasons nonetheless, there are are people in Scotland 
who fear that the universities may be treated less favourably than other 
institutions of higher education by a Scottish Assembly. More to the point, 
they may be treated less favourably than they are now. One feature of the 
universities which Mcintyre discusses is that they, like Janus, face in two 
directions - to the Scottish school system and to the international world of 
scholarship and science. Many university teachers feel that a Scottish 
Assembly may fail to understand or respect their participation in this 
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world. 
Political control of the judicial system raises no fewer thorny issuer;. 
Indeed, because the judicial system is of such fundamental importance to 
the liberty of people in our society, the issues are even more complex. We 
print two articles on this subject. 
Lord Wheatley is the Lord Justice Clerk. When he rose in the House of 
Lords in January he gave the considered view of the High Court judges on 
the role they might play in a devolved scheme. This incidentally, was a 
question which the White Paper had left unresolved. But his speech is not 
just a response to the White Paper. His discussion of the issues of 
accountability, of professional standards and of jucicial independence is 
resonant beyond our immediate situation. Above all, he is concerned to 
protect the independence and integrity ofthe courts. These, he fears, might 
be endangered by a proximate Assembly. There would be a danger of 
political control. 
Professor MacCormick joins the debate at just this point. The truth is, 
he says, that the values Lord Wheatley wishes to defend are supremely 
political. The desire to preserve- or create - an independent, non-partisan 
judiciary is at the heart of our system of political values. The question 
between them is this: Whom do you trust? Those who are against 
devolution do not trust a Scottish Assembly- but they may have to live with 
it. 
IV 
Whatever the shape of the devolutionary settlement, its financial and 
economic context becomes increasingly clear. The entire public sector is 
facing increasingly uncomfortable decisions as the full import of the 
government's determination to hold down real levels of public expenditure 
is driven home. Whether or not the beleagured White Paper on Public 
Expenditure takes too optimistic a view of the next few years is 
immaterial: its projections are in any case bleak. The health service and 
local government are not alone in having to reappraise the services they 
offer and the number of staff they employ. All sectors of government are 
officially or unofficially reviewing even the most draconian of alternatives 
open to them. This is easier in some areas than others. There is no doubt 
that for social work, for example, the agonies are extreme. Local authority 
social work departments have grown rapidly over the years since the 
generic service was created, so inculcating an expectation of continuing 
expansion. This is bad enough, but it has been made worse by an ever 
increasing volume of legislation and central government directives 
imposing obligations which require more resources if they are to be met. 
All this does not augur well for an Assembly. It is likely to arrive on the 
scene unable to flex its muscles very much, caught in the financial squeeze 
of the moment. Few would deny that there is fat to be lost in the public 
sector or that a review of public provision is a good thing: it is just that it is 
easier to talk about than to do. For politicians it is especially difficult for 
they live by their aspirations and these are usually met by expansion. 
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There are few votes to be won by cutting services and there is no glamour 
attached to 'discussing priorities' when what that means is that the items at 
the bottom of the list will be lost without trace. To ask politicians to do this 
at the moment when they are trying to establish new political institutions 
and to be seen to govern better than their distant predecessors is to cry for 
the moon. Nevertheless, it is the real world that has to be managed and 
whether politics is the art of the possible or the impossible, the problems 
remain the same. 
John Firn demonstrates the demands - and the difficulties- for economic 
policy. It is of no comfort to the present Secretary of State that he presides 
over the worst problems or urban deprivation in Western Europe and it will 
be no comfort to an Assembly either. The dilemmas posed by the industrial 
degeneration of the West are acute and it is manifestly unrealistic to 
believe that the spin-off of oil will be the panacea. It is salutary to be 
reminded, for example, that the electronics industry which appeared to be 
the saviour of Fife a decade ago has been caught badly short in the 
recession. It is also politically and socially naive to argue, as one recent 
commentator has done, that the West should be allowed to die and that new 
development should be concentrated in the East. Scotland's economic 
difficulties are deep-rooted and require bold new thinking. MacKay and 
Smallwood demonstrate that there is no unanimity among economists! 
Would an independent Scotland be more prosperous than a devolved 
Scotland? As the two essays we present on this subject show, one's answer 
to this question depends on the answers given to a number of other 
questions. What, first, of all, is 'independence'? Any potential economic 
advantage of independence would depend on the terms agreed by the 
separating parties over such matters as North Sea Oil and the national 
debt. It is impossible to believe that English politicians could get 
parliamentary approval for a settlement which gave Scotland complete 
control over all the hydrocarbons in theN orth Sea. But now much would be 
given? 
Another question arises over the political ability of the leaders of a 
newly independent Scotland to postpone the economic benefits of 
independence while the oil money was invested in new productive 
plant. The temptation would be to have 'jam today' - to spend any 'oil 
money' on immediate consumption. Indisputably, Scotland has its share of 
poverty- problems which increased supplementary benefits and pensions, 
decreased council house rents and rates could do a lot to alleviate in the 
short run. But if 'oil money' is to be of lasting benefit to future generations 
short run measures must be avoided. Increased consumption would add 
little to Scotland's productive capacity. In tne first instance it would 
largely be a boon to foreign manufacturers. Again the judgement is 
political. MacKay believes we can trust a Scottish government to invest its 
revenues wisely: Smallwood is sceptical.. 
It is important in this respect to note that there are a number of 
challenges to the basic assumptions of the devolution debate from the 
industrial world. While it can readily be agreed that, in some sense, 
Scotland is most likely to solve well Scotland's problems, the argument can 
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easily become polemic. There are those who think that the uncertainty of 
the upheaval, the unpredictability of a new group of politicians and the 
possibilities of the 'slippery slope' becoming a reality, will be enough to 
frighten off those with a lot to lose. Capitalists and entrepreneurs are one 
obvious group. While experience can only confirm or deny the argument, it 
is one of which we should not lose sight. 
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Our political environment is changing in many ways. Devolution is but 
one of them. Some of the other changes have nothing to do with devolution 
but will pose problems for the devolved Assembly as soon as it is 
established. Religious education is one such issue - and a politically 
explosive one at that. Within the past year there has been an interesting 
debate amongst Roman Catholics about the continued existence of a 
separate Roman Catholic, though state supported, school system. There is 
good reason for wider public interest in this debate. Separate religious 
school systems are supported by public money and established by law. 
Secondly, separate systems provide separate career ladders for teachers 
so that churches retain a certain amount of patronage - no small 
advantage for minority groups. Thirdly, there is a political issue. The 
Roman Catholic population in Scotland, which is approximately one-sixth 
of thew hole, is concentrated in and around Glasgow. This same area is the 
Labour Party's traditional stronghold. According to a poll of voters in that 
area taken shortly after the February 1974 election, no fewer than 79.3 per 
cent of Catholics who had voted had voted Labour. The community of 
interest between Church leaders and Labour politicians hardly needs 
under lining. 
Archbishop Winning started the present round of the debate in his 
pastoral letter in February of this year. In the letter, which we reprint, he 
attacks the increasingly secular nature of education. This, he believes, will 
undermine support for Catholic education amongst Catholic parents. From 
the debate which has followed, some of the contributions to which we print, 
it is clear that not all Catholics think that the present system is the best way 
to preserve The Faith. It is also clear that educational and religious 
arguments have been mixed with those of self-interest and party political 
advantage. For example, as Colin McLean notes, the Labour Party cannot 
make up its mind. This is not surprising since the party is torn between an 
ideological commitment to comprehensive education and a praCtical need 
not to shake the very bedrock of its electoral support. 
One valuable feature of the present system of Westminster based politics 
is that, so far as Scotland is concerned, it has served to obscure sectarian 
politics. Under the now defunct two-party system, both parties were 
content not to dwell on their sectarian support. It suited both for the 
Catholic minority to be enveloped in the Labour vote. In this situation the 
clergy, and especially the Catholic clergy, had considerable indirect 
power. Democrats are forced to condemn such indirect power on principle. 
But can anyone be sure that the break-up of the old system will not lead to 
the formation of purely sectarian groupings? Is there anyone who would 
welcome that prospect? 12 
VI 
The nature of the political debate in general and the devolution debate in 
particular raises the question of scale. There are no rules about what size of 
community can support political institutions, but there are fair questions to 
be asked about the space needed for political life to flourish. The running 
has been made in recent years by the advocates of small units. Empire is to 
be replaced by Community. The trend is international: participation in 
place of representation~ anonymous bureaucracies are old hat; decisions 
are to be made by those whom they affect; uniform standards are 
unnecessary. Nationalist movements are breaking up nation states in 
much of the world: Canada, Lebanon, Northern Ireland, France, Spain, 
Ethiopia, Pakistan, Nigeria, and now Scotland and Wales. 
Several different arguments are brought to bear by the advocates of 
smaller units of government. Each has been invoked on behalf of and 
adapted to Scotland. The first argument is for self-rule by 'natural 
communities'. Scotland is taken to be a natural community of Scots and 
Britain an unnatural agglomeration of peoples. The second argument is for 
rule by those who know from personal experience the conditions over which 
they rule. This is an argument for governingunits which include small 
numbers of people.Devolution of purely Scottish concerns accords with this 
argument. Both of these are arguments of principle. They are supported by 
arguments from history. It is urged that the nation-state was a necessity in 
the early period of vigorous capitalism, but is less relevant in an age of 
international capitalism and of international organisations. 
All these arguments ignore, where they do not indirectly controvert, some 
of the more painful lessons of eighteenth and nineteenth century political 
and social history.lt may, for example, be more difficult to sustain a notion 
of 'private space' in the less tolerant, less diverse world of 'natural 
communities'. Religious tolerance, to mention one problem, which had 
become somewhat less troublesome in the large, diverse, anonymous 
nation-state, could become a worry again. To be blunt about it, public 
opinion is not always constant or wise. It is at least arguable that a smaller 
political world will lend itself more easily to manipulation by passionate 
rhetoric. In such a world it might be difficult for minorities to find a niche. 
Devolution fightens the privileged, for the privileged are, by definition, 
minorities. But devolution also worries the aptly named Scottish Minorities 
Group - a pressure group for the rights of homosexuals - ,and their 
distinction is no privilege. The debate about our changing government 
must consider who may lose as well as who may gain. 
The distinction between proximate and distant control is perhaps one of 
degree. In the relatively restricted space of Scotland, with its relatively 
smallpopulation,the politicians (those political actors, that is, who act in 
public) will quite simply know more about what is going on. We may 
expect, in the first instance, that whatever devices the Assembly invents to 
correspond with Parliamentary Questions will elicit more useful and 
pertinent information than the present Westminster practices. This surely 
will be a gain. 
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One of the most resonant of the arguments in favour of small states 
derives from Rousseau. The argument is that only in small states can all 
men participate in governing and only by governing can men develop their 
full potential for responsible action. It is frequently suggested that 
devolution or independence will make Scots more responsible, more 
energetic and more enterprising. This too is an attractive argument. 
Certainly if it were true then devolution or independence would create a 
richer Scotland. Yet it is worth remembering that one of the arguments 
against the old local government system was that it required too many 
councillors, to run it. The reformers hoped that the new system, which has 
room for approximately one-half of the number of councillors would 
encourage new men to come and and force the weakest of the old out. It is 
too early to judge the new system in this respect. I tis, in any case, absurd to 
expect many intelligent and energetic people to give up paid employment, 
or accept lower remuneration in paid employment in order to spend half of 
their time being unpaid councillors. 
It is conceivable, of course, that the advent of the Assembly will attract a 
young generation of public spirited people who would not otherwise have 
entered public life. But this new crop will take time to ripen and who will 
run the Assembly meantime? 
VII 
As James Kellas shows, it is unlikely that political activity after 
devolution will be a simple continuation of the present pattern. Nor are we 
likely to return to two-party politics for the foreseeable future. If we cannot 
go as far as to believe that 'Right' and 'Left' will soon as as irrelevant as 
'Cavalier' and 'Roundhead', it is certainly plausible to suggest that the 
importance formerly accorded that distinction will diminish. It is 
interesting, in this light, that 'Right' and 'Left' in no way correspond to 
'anti' or 'pro' devolutionist or 'pro' or 'anti' unionist. At the moment we 
have a multi-party system. As things stand and assuming the present 
electoral system, each of the main parties would have some seats at 
Westminster, some in the Assembly and some in local government. 
As Kellas has reminded u.s more than once, Scotland has not had a 
two-party system since the Second World War. Since 1967 there have been 
four main parties and there is now a fifth in the reckoning. Two important 
points should be made about this. Firstly, there is no reason to believe that 
there is anything magical about two, three, four or five. Indeed, once there 
are more than two the incentive for keeping the parties intact is decreased. 
Our three largest parties - Conservative, Labour and National - are all 
coalitions; any of them could divide. Evidence from elsewhere suggests 
that proportional representation, currently a fasionable idea, could assist 
such fissiparous tendencies. Some might initially welcome such 
developments on the grounds that they would allow more straightforward 
representation of the views of different groups of citizens. However, beside 
the apparent advantages have to be set the disadvantages of small groups 
locked in conflict round relatively small sets of issues. Coalitions within 
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parties are advantageous when it comes to the resolution of conflict and the 
business of the daily compromise of political life. 
Our second point is this: a party rarely springs into existence and grows 
to maturity unless it represents an important group in society. Each of the 
parties is therefore likely to need the support of an identifiable group of 
voters. Differences between parties will give expression to the differences 
between these groups: this expression may accentuate the original social 
divisions. 
There are a number of social divisions within Scotland, any one of 
which could prove important. The most obvious is between the West 
Central industrial area- roughly Strathclyde Region- and the rest. Already 
the argument about how to spend the oil revenues is partly an argument 
between Strathclyde (favouring consumption) versus the East (favouring 
industrial investment). Strathclyde has an identifiable community of 
interest and a history of insularity which, since it contains about half the 
electorate, may lead its representatives to organise against a coalition of 
everyone else. 
Another obvious division is between Scotland's rural and urban areas. 
Scotland has two different and equally intractable social problems - the 
decay of central Strathclyde and the Highlands. The highlanders might 
easily feel called upon to unite in defence of their interests against those of 
the industrial areas. Both Conservatiyes and National parties would have 
much to lose if such a division emerged. The highland voters might want a 
party they could trust, not one dominated by the central industrial belt; 
least of all one dominated by Strathclyde. Geographically based divisions 
are not the only possibilities. As we mentioned before, sectarian 
differences might achieve political expression. 
As Kellas shows, a number of English anti-devolutionists have opposed 
devolution because they fear it as the first step to separation. They see the 
Assembly as a platform for separatist demands, and this is also the 
Nationali&~ view. In that case our changing Scotland is in for a shock. We 
think these prognostications overdone. There is a danger, to be sure, that 
the presently envisaged changes will become uncontrollable. But it is also 
possible that once an Assembly is set up it will domesticate the wilder men. 
Power moderates. Indeed, it strikes us that now that an Assembly has 
been promised by all parties, the real threat to orderly progress arises 
from frustration. If this government in unwilling or unable to deliver a bill 
and pass it into law, the expectations it has raised could create a cynical, 
perhaps even a violent reaction. 
The government lacks a majority- yet it has raised high hopes of major 
constitutional changes in Scotland. What happens if it falters or calls a 
General Election before an Act is passed? Will a triumphant Conservative 
government have more pressing things on its mind? Will the present 
leadership of the National Party be swept awayin an impatient populist 
drive for independence? What would happen if a new extremist National 
Party leadership treated unsuccessfully for independence? There are 
many possibilities: the status quo is not one of them. 
Whatever happens, we are manifestly living in a changing, even a 
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rapidly changing, and certainly a fascinating Scotland. If we have taken it 
upon ourselves in this Introduction to point to some of the usually 
overlooked or underestimated dangers hidden within that change, that is 
not because we are gloomy. Far from it. Partly because of the political 
changes going on within it, Scotland is alive and exciting. Its government 
is much more interesting than it was until very recently, and, to us at least, 
it makes the rest of Great Britain seem dull. 
16 
